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This paper considers the tensions between personal liberty and the use of closed 
circuit television in the surveillance of citizens. The growing acceptance and seeming 
inevitability of increased risk and uncertainty in social life helps to underwrite 
surveillance measures such as CCTV alongside the monitoring of credit card 
transactions, email traffic, electronic messaging and so on. Important in this is the 
transformation of the category of citizen from notions of civil, political and social 
citizenship with their emphasis on a fullness of rights and participation, to the brittle 
citizenship of the responsible, ‘new’ citizen of the risk society.  
 
INTRODUCTION  
Perhaps it was the recent screening by the ABC of the 1942 Arthur Askey film Ghost 
Train where one of the characters on arrival in deepest Cornwall is asked why she has 
a gas mask with her. She replies ‘just in case’ and on a railway platform in a country 
that was never to suffer a gas attack this seems somehow to be apposite when, on the 
Channel 10 news (25/10/02), a gas mask is displayed following a security conference 
in Brisbane that, at a cost of $200, is depicted as a necessary and affordable item 
given the apparent likelihood of just such an occurrence in Australia. But back to the 
Ghost Train - marooned at this railway station, the characters discover that the ghost 
train of the film’s title is in fact a decoy train full of ‘fifth columnists’ or in today’s 
parlance ‘terrorists’, busy stockpiling weapons for a Nazi invasion of Britain. 
Through a devastating mixture of end-of-the-pier humour and serendipity, Askey 
exposes the fifth columnists who, up to this point, have posed as ordinary English folk 
upon whom one could rely and in their moment of exposure these agents revert to 
guttural accents and poor manners as befitting the proffered role for foreigners.  
 
It would simply be too much to claim a Jungian like synchronicity for these events in 
terms of the screening of a1942 propagandistic film and a post-Bali conference 
promoting gas masks and sterile tents for use in a nuclear, biological or chemical 
attack on Australia. However, the sense in which emerging discourses around a crisis 
of national security and the external threat allegedly posed by foreign agents, some of 
whom live amongst ‘us’, reflect the concerns and stratagems of earlier conflicts in 
articulating the priorities of the current war on terrorism is strong - we may have been 
here, or close to here, before. The growing clamour for increased security measures in 
the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and Bali bombings lends a sharp emphasis 
to changes already emerging in the recasting of the category of the responsible citizen 
in Western social democratic formations. The active and responsible citizen of the 
post-September 11 (and post-Bali) security epoch is now demonstrably different from 
the post-World War Two period when T.H. Marshall made a compelling case for a 
broad and inclusive concept of citizenship that defies reduction to narrow legal forms 
concerned with rights to residence and passports.  
 
CITIZENSHIP  
Marshall’s work originates in, and reflects, the concerns of the era of post-Second 
World War social reconstruction and the creation of political institutions pledged to 
secure European unity. The signing of the Charter of the United Nations on 26 June 
1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1948 and The 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child on 20 November 1959, are significant 
milestones in the expression and pursuit of universal human rights (Rees and Wright 
2000). The creation in Britain of the welfare state through the Beveridge Plan of 1942 
and the implementation of Keynesian economic policies of full employment and high 
levels of public expenditure helped to create the social democratic welfare state and 
post war social, economic and political consensus. This consensus remained in place 
from the late 1940s until the onset of The New Right in the late 1970s (Tomlinson 
1996, Culpitt 1992).  
 
Marshall’s work is, according to Jayasuriya (1996:21), ‘highly influential’ in 
theorizing citizenship as comprising three stages of broad historical struggle towards 
civil, political and social citizenship expressed in the form of a range of dynamic 
rights. Civil rights may be understood as individual rights to personal freedom in the 
form of ‘liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own 
property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice’. Political citizenship 
is ‘the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body 
invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body’. 
Social citizenship is more amorphous and complex including economic security and 
equal access to education and again in Marshall’s own words is ‘…the whole range 
from a right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to 
the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the 
standards prevailing in a civilized society’ (Marshall 1950:10-11).  
 
Marshall’s work has been subjected to critique. As Williamson (1997) argues, 
Marshall offers an Anglo-centric and historically specific conceptualisation based on 
the continuing existence of a social democratic welfare state with a white male, 
married breadwinner chiefly at its core. Issue is taken by Coles (1995) with 
Marshall’s acceptance of the sustainability of policies of full employment (although 
the recent move to a 35 hour working week in France as one element within a policy 
of full employment is worth noting) and key assumptions around the stability of the 
nuclear family form and its underpinning of unwaged work by married women.  
 
Criticism also comes from the New Right for whom the dismantling of the post-war 
social democratic consensus and the curtailment of the welfare state in a number of 
countries in the 1980s onwards provides the opportunity to challenge notions of 
rights, needs, social entitlements and equality within citizenship theorizing (Culpitt 
1992). More recently Murray (1994) and Etzioni (1995) have asserted that political, 
civil and social rights have exceeded responsibilities and form part of an alleged 
problem of welfare dependency and lack of community spirit. For conservative 
commentators, such as Murray (1994), there can be no rights until social duties and 
obligations have first been met and he proposes that the receipt of welfare benefits 
and other aspects of state support should be contingent on appropriate social 
behaviour and the execution of civil duties.  
Due in part to the efforts of the New Right, in the form of Thatcherism in Britain and 
its resonance elsewhere, in seeking to dismantle the welfare state a new interest in 
Marshall’s work has emerged because (criticisms of his formulation not 
withstanding), ‘it provides a defensible justification of welfare and the welfare state’ 
(Jayasuriya 1996:24).  
 
Access to welfare provision is tied centrally to Marshall’s concept of citizenship and a 
number of writers observe the challenge to universalist welfare assumptions in the 
Thatcher and Major governments in the U.K. in the 1980s and 1990s. The key shift is, 
according to Haines and Drakeford (1998), away from any genuine sense of 
collectivity and rights towards the (re)construction of citizenship whereby the state 
retreats where possible from the guaranteeing and distribution of benefits in favour of 
residual mechanisms deployed through charitable agencies and organizations. A case 
study in point is the example of the U.K. school leaver in the 1960s with a strong 
connection to older workers and with little differentiation drawn by the state between 
the citizen at the age of 18, 28 or 38. By 1996, according to Haines and Drakeford 
(1998:11) this position had been entirely, and perhaps irrevocably, reversed. This is 
also confirmed, by Tomlinson (1996), as largely true of the Australian experience.  
 
RISK and RESPONSIBILITY  
The move to the individualization of the citizen and reducing welfare provision, while 
key tenets within New Right thinking in the 1980s and 1990s, also helped to create 
the conditions whereby the overarching discourse of risk and responsibility has 
become the major and contemporary theme for governments of differing political 
persuasions. The increasing ‘responsibilisation’ of individuals is, according to Rose 
(2000), a case of the acceptance of responsibility for personal actions across a wide 
range of fields of social and economic activity, in choice of diet, savings and pension 
arrangements, health care decisions and choices, home security measures and personal 
investment choices.  
 
When excavating the multitude of products now available on the market from 
terminal illness insurance to mortgage insurance cover in the event of unemployment 
or death, the text of persuasion, while usually remaining within requirements set by 
industry standards, nevertheless points to the alleged failings of the welfare state and 
its inability or reluctance any longer to provide care from ‘the cradle to the grave’ 
(Timmins1995).  
 
The growth in private health insurance in the U.K. and elsewhere illustrates some 
sense of frustration with the alleged failings of national health systems as well as the 
notion of rational consumer choice and the apparent empowerment of the individual 
to purchase, in the market place, cover to protect against the shortcomings of the 
public health system. Health care provides a substantial case study of the bringing 
together of a range of sometimes disparate discourses encompassed within the rubric 
of ‘risk’.  
 
In the last twenty years or so, a risk culture may be seen to have developed wherein 
the concept of risk and its description, measurement, assessment and management has 
become central to the governance and management of economic, political and social 
activity. The work of Beck (1992) is important in setting out the thesis of the Risk 
Society in terms of the movement from the alleged certainties and predictabilities of 
modernity to the uncertainties of late modernity where the world is an increasingly 
dangerous place typified by risk and uncertainty of employment, security, 
relationships, income and prospects.  
 
In the ‘advanced liberalism’ typical, according to Rose (2000), of late modern or 
postmodern social formations, self regulation by individuals is increasingly central to 
the execution of government social policy. In this formulation, the individual is cast 
as wholly responsible for their actions and life course decisions and is required to 
make the ‘right’ choices and if found wanting faces punishment in the form of 
exclusion or penalties. The ‘wrong’ choice over such life course issues as pension 
fund arrangements holds the consequence for the impoverished retiree of trying to 
access tightly constructed income support payments in increasingly vengeful welfare 
and social policy systems still largely predicated on assumptions of the deserving and 
the undeserving poor. The private pensions drive in the U.K. in the mid1980s, 
promoted by the Thatcher government under the banner of individual choice and 
opening state pension provision to the discipline of market forces, proved to be a 
major ‘misselling’ scandal with many state employees duped into leaving government 
schemes for inferior performing private schemes.  
 
In a move costing £1,100 million (BBC Online 27/10/02) participant companies have 
been compelled to refund monies lost compared to how the pension plans would have 
performed if retained in government schemes. This illustrates a remedy to a scenario 
of deceitful and commission hungry salespersons that might in current times be 
(re)constructed as poor choice making on the part of irresponsible consumers.  
This response would fit well with what Petersen and Bunton (1997) term as the 
‘internalization of risk’ whereby such overt acts of dishonesty by the private market 
become instead personal matters as pieces of ‘risky’ and speculative behaviour which 
warrant individual acceptance and ‘reflexivity’, as Giddens (1991) would have it, in 
terms of reviewing, on an ongoing basis, one’s lifestyle, future plans and options.  
The responsible individual is, according to Kemshall (2002), ‘prudential’ in being 
both rational and entrepreneurial in making informed decisions and choices on key 
personal and social issues and being prepared to shoulder the burden of making 
flawed decisions and accepting the full run of the implications rather than looking to 
government to provide compensation or deliverance. The term ‘prudence’ is 
significant in being the watchword of the U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon 
Brown, in delivering his first budgets from 1997 which honoured the spending limits 
of the previous conservative administration. A feature of this government’s approach 
to matters of social policy and welfare payments, which is also consistent with their 
Tory predecessors, is the critique of the despised visage of the so called ‘nanny state’ 
in favour of the ‘something for something’ society wherein ‘for those who can, work, 
those who can’t, security’ (Hann 2000).  
 
The example of health care again provides an instance of the reconstructed risk-
bearing citizen. As Kemshall (2002) notes, health promotion initiatives in the U.K. 
(and arguably Australia also), focus on the rationally informed individual making the 
‘right’ choices on healthy eating, smoking, drinking, whether to buy ‘preventative’ 
private health cover, avoidance of ‘risky’ lifestyle behaviours and use of health care 
screening to prevent health problems, for example in the growing popularity of 
expensive whole body scans. This reflects Giddens’ (1991) sense of subtle but 
fundamental shifts in welfare from the meeting of needs through benefits and 
services, to the prevention and displacement of risk.  
 
However, good health is, as Kemshall (2002) suggests, no longer a matter of rights 
within a broad social citizenship but a duty of the prudential, responsible citizen in 
reducing the burden of care on the state through appropriate and informed actions. 
Failure to adopt a healthy lifestyle then becomes, according to Lupton (1999), a sign 




A number of western ‘democratic’ and non-western social formations can be 
accurately described as ‘surveillance societies’ (Lyon 2001). However, the nature of 
the surveillance taking place is complex, far reaching and, in many ways, insidious. 
Surveillance needs to be set in the broadest context of most everyday human acts, 
including: shopping with loyalty cards, paying for goods with any form of swiped 
card, visiting a doctor or dentist, using a cell phone, paying utility bills, interfacing 
with any level of government, logging on to computers or using the internet. The 
array of forms of surveillance has almost become too numerous to mention.  
 
In their study of CCTV surveillance Norris and Armstrong (1999) note that, when 
added to the daily minutiae of surveillance listed here, CCTV surveillance in public 
space such as transport nodes of bus, tram and train stations, alongside the 
proliferation of other camera surveillance in speed cameras, traffic flow cameras and 
private camera systems in the workplace, the human being is potentially captured on a 
database somewhere, constantly. This gathering and compilation of information to 
form data achieves, in the words of Stalder (2002:120), a virtual solid form as a ‘data 
body’ which goes everywhere with the consuming citizen and goes before us in terms 
of carrying this weight of data to convey, for example, a track record of personal 
finance to a lending institution, or a snapshot of health records to a physician. On 
arrival, the citizen has already been ‘measured and classified’ and will be treated 
according to the criteria ‘connected with the profile that represents us.’  
 
Surveillance as information gathering and storage is not a product feature only of 
modernity, for, as Lyon (2002:2) notes, a ‘simple and ancient’ form of data 
compilation may be discerned in England in the 1500s in taxation, census and early 
Poor Law administration. This inaugural moment in the creation of the ‘information 
state’, while delineating limited rights to hold private property and receive parish poor 
relief, also built the infrastructure for potential and substantial efforts at social control, 
for example over religious orders or workers seeking to organize themselves. This 
paradox of surveillance holds true of contemporary society and tempers analysis to 
avoid over deterministic findings of Orwellian proportions of crude social control. 
Surveillance may be said to be dual faced, as Lyon (2002:4) notes, for the same 
ubiquitous infrastructure which can record ‘private’ telephone conversations from an 
orbiting satellite and log the tins of paint purchased on the way to work, can also 
protect life, support social justice and encourage ‘participation in political life’, to the 
extent that seemingly negative aspects of surveillance can be disputed depending on 
one’s standpoint. The phenomenon of routine mass surveillance is mutually 
implicated with the emergence of the ‘risk society’ which, in Beck’s formulation 
(1992:27), comes about when the ‘social, political, ecological, and individual risks 
created by the momentum of innovation elude increasingly the control and protective 
institutions of industrial society.’  
 
The work of Foucault (1974, 1977) has application here in providing a critical context 
within which to interrogate issues of power, information and surveillance. He was 
inspired by Bentham’s invention of the Panoptican or Inspection House, based on an 
isolated and regularly structured place in which the individual is subjugated to the 
norms of work, education and other disciplinary processes. Situated within the 
Panoptican, it is possible to sanction or reward the individual for her or his behaviour 
as all activities of inmates are monitored without their knowledge. For Foucault 
(1977:155) it is this gaze of surveillance, unknowingly received by the subject, that is 
fundamental to the exercise of power:  
 
There is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze. 
An inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by 
interiorising to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus 
exercising this surveillance over, and against himself.  
 
Certain aspects of the Panoptican may be discerned in the architectural order and 
arrangement of buildings of both open and closed institutions such as prisons, clinics, 
asylums and schools so as to facilitate the effectiveness and economy of the hidden or 
unseen gaze. As Foucault (1977:201) again notes:  
 
Hence the major effect of the Panoptican: to induce in the inmate a state of 
consciousness and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning 
of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, 
even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should 
tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus 
should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent 
of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in 
a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers.  
 
A number of writers (Fopp 2002, Lyon 1994, 2001, 2002, Norris and Armstrong 
1999) point to the opportunity afforded by Foucault’s analysis to make sense of lines 
of continuity and change between earlier forms of surveillance and data assemblage 
and contemporary forms in the shape of CCTV and other surveillance modes. For 
example, Fopp (2002) argues that in schools, hospitals and social security offices, 
electronic surveillance has taken the place of the personal observation of service 
users. The panoptican is described by Foucault (1980:148) as ‘a technology of power 
designed to solve the problems of surveillance’ and from this statement it is possible 
to hypothesise outwards to critique the role and purpose of CCTV surveillance. 
However, Lyon (2002) and Fyfe and Bannister (1996) caution against injudicious use 
of concepts like the panoptican and their application to the contemporary urban 
streetscape without considerable qualification and modification, in order to fully take 
account of the contradictory, complex and contested nature of spatial and power 
relationships. The stage of ‘advanced liberalism’ (Rose 2000) within modernity-post 
modernity requires considerable degrees of self-governance, regulation and 
surveillance whereby the individual is constructed both as a ‘new citizen’ and as a key 
site of self-management. An example of this self-management and surveillance is the 
welfare system in both the U.K. and Australia. Despite the national governments (one 
‘new’ Labor, one conservative) seemingly being of differing political persuasions, 
strikingly similar imperatives around reducing welfare dependency, benefit fraud and 
emphasizing the centrality (wholesomeness) of paid work, may be discerned.  
 
In Centrelink unemployment benefits and their ethos of ‘mutual obligation’ a panoply 
of surveillance, self-reporting and disciplinary measures, such as ‘breaching’, is 
enacted. The completion of ‘dole diaries’ to document the jobseeker’s efforts to 
obtain employment (usually a minimum of 10 verifiable efforts in a fortnight) are an 
illustration; the diary may be requested at any time, with refusal bringing forth 
disciplinary action. The diaries must otherwise be produced by a date decided by the 
Centrelink officer when giving the document to the job seeker and, on this appointed 
date, the diary is handed in to the Centrelink office, usually to a general member of 
staff, not the claimant’s ‘personal adviser’. If checks made on the veracity of entries 
are satisfactory, the claimant is not applauded for their efforts, but a new diary is sent 
in the mail and benefit payments continue, presumably because the unseen ‘gaze’ has 
been satisfied on this occasion. Alongside this self-scrutiny and surveillance, the 
individual is constantly required to report any changes in circumstances and all 
citizens are encouraged to inform on other citizens they know, or think they know, to 
be defrauding the welfare system in some way. Anonymous tip offs are given the 
status of credible evidence and are investigated. ‘Successes’ are defined in terms of 
terminated claims, repayments or prosecutions and are celebrated by the Minister 
responsible as preserving the system from miscreants (‘them’) so that the decent folk 
(‘us’) can continue to receive payments to which we may be due.  
 
This is but a brief odyssey through a complex and labyrinthine system wherein the 
extent of responsibility for negotiating its paths successfully and lawfully which falls 
on the claimant is considerable and daunting in terms of the penalties for failure to do 
so. The language of articulation here, is the homespun recipe of honesty, decency and 
the absolute priority to protect tax payers’ interests, such that millions of dollars lost 
in defence or in other spending areas can be massaged away as ‘cost overruns’, while 
a small over payment to a single parent is represented as an intolerable atrocity 
perpetrated on the community of all tax payers, requiring harsh punishment, 
repayment and surveillance.  
 
The construction of the community of taxpayers is an important discourse in 
suggesting that a commonality exists between such disparate interests. Similarly, the 
construction of the ‘othered’ ones in the form of the ‘dole bludger’ and ‘welfare 
cheat’ form significant and sclerotic discourses of exclusion which play a central role 
in the acceptance and ‘normalistion’ of the array of surveillance forms and 
technologies deployed.  
 
CCTV  
The normalisation of surveillance can be seen particularly in relation to CCTV over 
the last 10 years. As Lyon (2002) notes, the U.K. has the most developed system of 
both urban and rural public space cameras in the world and this growth of camera 
surveillance has been achieved with very little, if any, public debate as to their 
benefits or otherwise, with the Bulger murder case and IRA terrorism pivotal points in 
their apparent efficacy.  The emergence of so called ‘Reality T.V.’ in the form of ‘Big 
Brother’ and an assortment of variations on this theme have contributed, at least in 
part, to the normalisation, and even popularity, of camera surveillance - whether 
CCTV or ‘web-cams’ which permit surveillance and dissemination via the internet of 
the most intimate of human actions. As Groombridge (2002:39) notes, giving birth on 
the Internet is now popular, with the British ‘glamour’ model Jordan to do so on a 
‘pay-per-view’ basis.  
 
The use of acted CCTV images posing as ‘real’ footage of events in police dramas is 
also discernable in recent episodes shown on the ABC of The Bill, Pie in the Sky, and 
Wire in the Blood where images of car number plates, crowd scenes and street crime 
add an apparent slice of grainy reality through the perceived hallmark of the CCTV 
evidential image. The acceptance of a range of surveillance cameras overseeing public 
and private space, traffic conditions and city centres, suggests that it is now a 
seemingly ‘natural’ and more or less normal feature of urban and, increasingly, rural 
life to the extent that Graham (1998) argues, it has become the ‘fifth utility’ merging 
with the urban landscape in a similar way to the utility infrastructures of previous 
centuries. Increasingly as Graham and Marvin (2001) note, new urban housing and 
commercial developments are designed with unobstructed lines of sight to facilitate 
the operation of CCTV cameras already incorporated into the building plan. For the 
domestic market it is possible to install CCTV surveillance to ‘guard’ one’s house and 
grounds and to view the cameras from monitors in the house and for remote 
monitoring also, for a fee, by a private security company.  
 
A component in the acceptance of camera surveillance, apart from the sheer number 
and range already installed, is the much vaunted role they are alleged to play in 
reducing crime. Groombridge (2002) points to the over-celebration of CCTV 
successes which can undermine the contribution of appropriate policing methods and 
information provided by members of the public towards the resolution of a case. The 
U.K. Home Office, itself a major purchaser of CCTV systems for town centre 
surveillance operations, issued guidance against the uncritical installation of CCTV 
systems stressing the cost effective contribution that improved street lighting and 
design improvements can make to better community safety and crime reduction 
(Home Office 1994). At roughly the same time as issuing this guidance, Norris and 
Armstrong (1999) note that eighty per cent of the crime prevention budget was being 
spent on camera supply and installation without any formal system of evaluation. It is 
estimated that £600 million was spent this way in 1999 and that monitoring costs 
alone would be £100 million each year by 2000, according to Baldrey and Painter 
(1998), while Norris and Armstrong (1999) estimate that up to17 million hours of 
CCTV footage are generated on a weekly basis.  
 
The lack of critical evaluation of CCTV is being challenged by the work of Ditton 
(1999) and Norris and Armstrong (1999) but, as this comment from Ian Greenwood, 
Leader of Bradford Council, Yorkshire in 1998 suggests, CCTV, as a crime reduction 
and community safety tool funded by local councils, is here to stay. He states: ‘There 
will be no evaluation, we are committed to CCTV; there will be money spent on it; it 
is popular with working people’ (Bradford Telegraph and Argus 01/12/98:4).  
 
This is an important division drawn between ‘working people’ and the category of the 
‘others’ not mentioned, such as those who are not in employment; and the propensity 
of CCTV surveillance to act as a lens of discrimination is suggested in this comment 
from a local councillor in Newcastle (U.K.) on the case for a CCTV system on the 
West End estate (KDIS Online 21/12/99):  
 
It’s to do with the kind of community you have here. You have a problem of 
loose families. Single mothers, men who drift around. There is a dislocation 
from normal expectations, from normal manners, if you like, a breakdown of 
basic rules and social codes. What do you do with working-class men who no 
longer have any possibility of a job and no means of earning self respect? 
They are too poor, and too poorly educated to take collective responsibility for 
their own problems. To some extent, I suppose, the cameras are a form of 
containment.  
 
This observation is full of value assumptions which cannot detain us here, but the 
work of Norris and Armstrong (1999:154), in 592 hours of monitoring at three varied 
sites in the U.K., noted that the young, the male and the black, were systematically 
targeted, not because of their involvement in crime or disorder, but for ‘no obvious 
reason’. Forty per cent were targeted on the basis of ‘belonging to a particular or 
subcultural group’, with black people being more than twice as likely to be watched 
than others, and for longer time periods. Most of this surveillance targeting is based 
on little more than the camera operator’s ‘normative ecology’, or value-based 
assumptions as to who the ‘usual suspects’ are or should be. For example, those 
persons considered to be ‘out of time and out of place’ were watched while persons in 
uniform were completely exempt from targeting, possibly being acknowledged by the 
camera operator as ‘one of us’. Another feature noted by Groombridge (2002:32) was 
the amount of male-on-male violence reported to police, while violence to women 
from men they were with was not. As he suggests, ‘even if surveillance systems are 
all seeing they are not all knowing’.  
 
The security industry maintains that CCTV is not ‘Big Brother’ in the sense of 
Orwell’s 1984 scenario, but instead a ‘Big Friend’ watching out for people using 
public space, to protect them from nefarious individuals (the poor and desperate) out 
to get them. The assertion that cameras are there to protect people again provides a 
basis for their assumed effectiveness and normalisation but, given the proclivities of 
camera operators and the expense of real time monitoring, there is the possibility that 
the camera on which one may rely in a car park or underpass may not be monitored in 
real time. As a recent report by NACRO (The National Association for the Care and 
Resettlement of Offenders 2002), suggests, CCTV has a place within a broad and 
variegated crime reduction and community safety program, but warns against over-
investment in camera technology at the expense of more durable and less costly 
measures such as better street lighting and more visible policing of all areas. These 
are likely to be more effective in promoting personal safety than relying on cameras if 
‘big friend’ is not watching tonight. The report also cautions local councils to be 
skeptical about security industry claims of effectiveness given the high cost of camera 
systems and their continual and expensive upgrading, for example, into facial 
recognition systems and network interfacing. It is this last point that raises issues for a 
number of commentators for, increasingly through technical upgrades and 
developments, publicly funded traffic, surveillance and security CCTV systems and 
private camera systems can be enabled to network when required.  
 
While the creation of compatible surveillance databases which quietly indulge in 
algorithmic data matching exchanges may not, at face value, threaten democracy, for 
Norris and Armstrong (1999:173), accountability and oversight are key, if still 
underdeveloped, processes; ‘democratic institutions are not assured, they can and 
have been captured by totalitarian regimes of both the left and right’. Further, 
Geraghty (1998:17) argues, ‘the only criterion which distinguishes a modern traffic 
control system from the apparatus of political control is democratic accountability’. 
The question of democratic accountability is vexed and, as Taylor (2002) notes, forms 
a dialectic between changes in behaviour patterns and rapid developments in 
surveillance technology which may result in new regulations and protocols and 
technological apparatus to circumvent or negate them.  
 
In this way data protection and privacy measures enacted in a number of countries are 
likely to be only partially successful in the face of surveillance equipment that can 
transmit images and information at a speed that can subvert most regulation before the 
democratic process can come into play. The data might already be downloaded to 
remote servers possibly in several countries, with differing regulatory and oversight 
frameworks. The use of electronic audit programs, themselves a form of surveillance, 
to give a detailed account of the operational use of CCTV cameras in terms of zoom, 
tilt and pan actions and the limiting of camera function and facilities to only what is 
required by the surveillance setting is, according to Taylor (2002), one instance of 
accountability that would permit the watchers to be effectively watched and also 
provide an oversight model for other surveillance modes.  
 
CONCLUSION  
Attempts at social change in the twenty-first century must take a range of issues into 
account in order to be relevant and effective. A key issue concerns the concept of 
citizenship itself, which has, in the last twenty to thirty years, undergone a 
transmutation from the heady possibilities conjured up by Marshall in the immediate 
post-Second World War period. The ‘new citizen’ of the risk society is the socially 
responsible, self-regulating data subject who, according to Kemshall (2002), receives 
surveillance as an everyday routine and supports its application in order to preserve 
what is seen as the virtues of democratic, consuming society. The active ‘new citizen’ 
is implicated in their own surveillance and that of others, albeit in subtle ways that 
connote ‘free will’ but are nevertheless constrained.  
 
The advance of the New Right in Britain and its equivalent political processes 
elsewhere in particular around attempts at the ‘rolling back of the welfare state’, 
contributed to the reconfiguration and constriction of the meanings attached to 
citizenship, captured in eloquent infamy by Margaret Thatcher in stating: ‘There is no 
such thing as society. There are only individual men and women, and there are 
families’ (Woman’s Own 31/10/87). The discourses given comfort in this assertion 
emphasise duty and responsibility over civil, social and political rights and to an 
extent still inform contemporary debates on active citizenship and citizenship 
education for young people in particular.  
 
There is, however, resistance to aspects of surveillance and positioning as data 
subjects and this may be harnessed by social change agents. As Lyon (2002) notes, 
much of the same surveillance and CCTV equipment deployed by the authorities has 
been used by citizens’ oppositional groups, such as The New York Players who 
perform dramatic pieces to urban CCTV cameras. In a similar vein, Groombridge 
(2002) depicts the ‘organised powerless’ as forming an important moment of 
opposition in using camera technology linked to web sites, providing real time 
alternative evidence of the conduct of a protest action or event available to a world 
audience. The issue here is, whose account counts as ‘truth’ in the retelling of events 
to provide the folklore of resistance movements or court evidence.  
 
As for the Ghost Train, Arthur Askey triumphs over the terrorists who, remember, had 
been posing as normal English folk, by opening a bridge over a river as their train 
crosses it, thus condemning all the occupants to drown in the icy waters below. There 
is, perhaps, a certain economy to this process in excising the problem of the formal 
judicial process in the shape of evidence gathering and trials which might be envied 
by ASIO in its current smash and grab mode in preserving the security of Australia 
(The Australian 31/10/02). Sadly, what is being constructed in these exceptional times 
is a security state, not a social security state which might indeed be worth protecting 
in the promotion of a genuine attack on poverty and a commitment to the building of a 
better and more just society. Perhaps this ambition is the real Ghost Train which has 
yet to arrive, but one waits in hope, gas mask at the ready, just in case.  
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